Experience After the Speculative Turn

“…there is some comfort in the idea […] of following experience, but following it all the way to the end”

Bruno Latour¹

“Something happens at around 92 miles an hour. Thunder headers drown out all sound. Engine vibration travels at a heart’s rate. Field of vision funnels into the immediate. And suddenly, you’re not on the road –
You’re in it, a part of it.”

Jackson Teller²

Introduction

In the way that truth has been a “term of derision in much continental philosophy”, the same can be said about experience after the Speculative Turn.³ Situated within a larger analysis of peace-gaming and peace-simulation⁴, this paper seeks to come to terms with the ‘experience’ created during the interaction with such ‘technology’.³ Debates about this, that is Human Computer Interaction (HCI), have largely been framed by phenomenological approaches, paying attention to how participants to these games make sense of the digitally generated environment they are in and how digital images appear to and shape the user. In contrast, this paper aims to re-engage with HCI –indeed collapse the human computer divide– but from a Speculative and post-phenomenological fashion. The entry into HCI, peace-gaming specifically, happens via experience, the study of which is most frequently associated with Phenomenology. The aim is to be able to speculate about experience from a post-phenomenological standpoint through posing and pursuing three interrelated questions: (i) how does experience occur during HCI?; (ii) leading on from this, are there boundaries between the human and the non-human (technical) during these interactions?; (iii) lastly, what then constitutes a body(subject) in HCI?

In regards to (i), the paper will find its entry point via Anupa Batra, who shows that Deleuze develops a new conception of experience.⁵ Related to this and in pursuit of (ii), Latour’s claim in “pragmatogonies” –that humans and nonhumans swap properties⁶– and Adrian Mackenzie’s adaptation of Gilbert Simondon’s notion of “technicity” will highlight

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² Jackson Teller, Sons of Anarchy, Season Five, Episode 1, opening lines, aired 11 September 2012.
⁴ Hereafter, peace-simulations and peace-gaming will be referred to as gaming or peace-gaming only, in order to avoid a confusion with more Nietzschean and Baudrillardian inspired notions of simulacra and simulation.
the non-boundary between humans and “technology”. Point (iii) will continue Simondon’s criticism of hylomorphism with accounts by Manuel DeLanda on nonorganic life and on the self-ordering of matter. This point pursues the question of the status of “experience” in and among forceful, (non)(organic) bodies during peace-gaming.

After Phenomenology
The paper seeks a post-phenomenological position in order to avoid two things; first, do follow Kantian idealism, and second to avoid an analysis of HCI in which computer images appear to the gamer, rather the he/she perceives and makes sense of them according to pre-given structures of the mind. The argument is that phenomenology is not only an extension of Kantian idealism, but that this prevents to talk about experience as anything else other than recognition. The consequence of this is that experience based on recognition is deeply entrenched in regimes of representation which fail to account for the emergence of new experience and, thus, new ways of thinking. The following section will briefly summarize idealist and phenomenological limitations and pick up epistemological concerns as first articulated by Kant in order to set up a different approach to experience.

What’s Wrong With the Kantian Experience?
According to Deleuze, the Kantian conception of experience is problematic because it makes it impossible to account for new experience and how it can emerge. Thus, this investigation is driven by Deleuze’s critique on Kant. The goal is to show how he transforms Kantian transcendentalism in order to rearticulate empiricism and experience.

Apart from dividing the world into the noumenal and phenomenal and maintaining that one ought to ponder the empirical world objectively, Kant manifested that humans can only experience and perceive the phenomenal world according to certain rational structures of the mind. That is, the human only knows things as far as they are presented to thought, but does not actually have access to the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich). Furthermore, in order to be able to think at all, the mind needs to imagine things as occurring in time and space and it is through that things are presented to the mind. Therefore, Kantian idealist assumptions hold that humans construct their reality according to their perception and experience of the phenomenal world, “regardless of whether things really exist in space and in time, in some absolute sense, independently of us”. This means two things. First, the rejection of any absolute from an idealist standpoint and, second, that knowledge cannot possibly reach beyond sensible experience and is limited to the perception, rather the empirical grasp, of things, since only “divine beings” could obtain knowledge of Kant’s Ding an sich. However, within these empirical boundaries rigorous knowledge is possible, as long as it is observable and testable by senses and corresponding scientific laws. The sciences'
“forming, materializing, and measuring activity” is actually just a habit of the mind.\textsuperscript{13} As a consequence, this position draws a sharp distinction between the material world and the observer, which is the perpetuation and intensification of the Aristotelian separation between matter and mind.

Out of such a distinction emerges a dualistic order that dominates Kantian idealism, including its phenomenological variants, as well as those traditions that actually distance themselves from Kant’s transcendentalism.\textsuperscript{14} According to Meillassoux and Moulard-Leonard even materialist, existentialist and phenomenologists bear the dualistic mark.\textsuperscript{15} Furthermore, the idea is that knowledge of reality independent of thought does not exist. Again the consequence is a distinction drawn between the objective and the subjective world, which means that everything is broken down into and analysed as a problem between subject and object, or as a problem of the relation between the two. Ultimately, this makes Kantian idealism “almost ubiquitous”.\textsuperscript{16}

This creates an obstacle insofar as that the idealist and Cartesian dualism prescribe that experience is structured according to given \textit{a priori} categories which are supposed to be the universal conditions for all knowledge. Therefore, new thinking and experiencing always follow given structures of reason and, thus, are always already recognition.

This means however that transcendentalist philosophy makes it impossible to conceive of the production of the new.\textsuperscript{17} Kant’s dictates of common sense and the rational mind confine experience and limit it to what he calls the possibility of experience. In the context of this paper this means that peace-gaming, as a form of HCI, is already pre-confined by traditional transcendentalism, foreclosing any investigation into new experiences based on encounters with advanced technology that increasingly calls into question the validity of the noumenal and the phenomenal as separated realm. To adhere to this artificial distinction means that it is only possible to analyse HCI from a phenomenological position.

To recap quickly and broadly speaking, phenomenology addresses questions of the real through concepts of engagement with the world; being-with; corporality/embodiment and practice.\textsuperscript{18} The shortcomings a phenomenological approach entail that the question over the separation, not only of mind and body, but object and subject, remain. Often a phenomenological position holds that computer and networked technology transcendent the human body and organic sphere.


\textsuperscript{14} Bryant, Srnicek & Harman, 2011, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{15} Moulard-Leonard, 2008. The only difference is that these traditions have broadened the discussion to include being rather than just thinking. This view, to which Meillassoux refers to as “correlationism”, holds that thoughts are aimed at that humans exist as beings-in-the-world, but that it is impossible to speak about the world “independent of thought or language”, Bryant, Srnicek & Harman, 2011, p. 4; Zizek, S. 2012. \textit{Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism}. London: Verso, pp. 642-643.

\textsuperscript{16} Bryant, Srnicek & Harman, 2011, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{17} Batra, 2010, “Introduction”.

\textsuperscript{18} Note that within Phenomenology there is a tension between the abstract imagery of Cartesianism found in cognitive sciences (also known as the philosophy of mind among analytical philosophers), as presented by the earliest phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, and the interactionist alternative presented by his perhaps best-known student Martin Heidegger, Behnke, E.A. 2011. “Husserl’s Phenomenology of Embodiment”, retrieved from \textit{Encyclopaedia of Philosophy}, http://www.iep.utm.edu/husspemb/.
Continuing the criticism on phenomenology by Graham Harman, it is not only riddled with a “turbulent structure of objects” and undecided about them being immanent or transcendent\textsuperscript{19}, but the problem also concerns the experience for a subject and phenomenology’s treatment of reality. Through his “litmus test” Harman comes to the conclusion that phenomenology is in fact a philosophy of access.\textsuperscript{20} Specifically, that it does not deal with reality, but merely with human access to it, so that it remains restricted to the realms of language and cognition, which according to Harman means that phenomenology, despite all its practical purpose, is in fact idealism.\textsuperscript{21}

**Systems of Experience: From Transcendence to the Transcendental**

In an effort to go beyond language, cognition and idealism – by focusing on ‘sensuality’, movement and interaction– Deleuze’s critique on Kant’s transcendence philosophy and his own transcendental empiricism is used as a starting point. Following Anupa Batra’s work, this section reflects her and my interpretation of *Difference and Repetition*.\textsuperscript{22}

**Kant Again**

To what was just outlined Deleuze refers to as “the dogmatic image of thought” – also reflected in the problem of ‘representation’\textsuperscript{23}. In order to overcome this, Deleuze transforms Kant’s transcendental philosophy through reversing the term “experience” since his proposed conception of thought has to be understood “as occurring in and through experience, not apart from it”.\textsuperscript{24} According to Deleuze the dogmatism of thought is reflected in Kant’s theory of transcendental Ideas, which refers to the correspondence – or correlation in Meillassoux’s terms – between transcendental conditions of experience and empirical experience.\textsuperscript{25} Therefore, experience takes place when transcendental concepts of understanding relate with the empirical: the identification of particulars with given universals.\textsuperscript{26} This implies that experience is static and hypothetical instead of real and that the conditions of experience are merely conditions of possibility which remain external to what they condition.\textsuperscript{27}

Rather than drawing on the process of recognition, Deleuze accounts for thinking the new by drawing on the process of learning triggered by an Idea-problem.\textsuperscript{28} Using Kant’s theory of Ideas, Deleuze advances his own understanding of problems: Ideas must be immanent to experience in order to be truly problematic. Hence, he sees Ideas as transcendental problems


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, p. 42, he poses the question whether phenomenology has anything to say about the “impact of inanimate objects upon one another, apart from human awareness about this fact”, coming to the conclusion that the answer in this case is ‘no’.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, p. 42.


\textsuperscript{23} Generally speaking, with the dogmatic image of thought Deleuze refers to a tendency in philosophy itself, see for example Deleuze, 1994, pp. 167-8.

\textsuperscript{24} Batra, 2010, p.2.

\textsuperscript{25} Deleuze. 1994, p. 216. Furthermore, Kant’s shortcomings can be found in his method, which establishes transcendental conditions of experience by tracing back the end result, knowledge, to its conditions, Batra, 2010, p. 2; Deleuze, 1994, p. 215.

\textsuperscript{26} Batra, 2010, p. 2; Deleuze, 1994, p. 171.

\textsuperscript{27} Also, because in Kant experience is closed off it forms a totality.

\textsuperscript{28} Deleuze, 1994, p. 241; p. 215.
which pose a systematic field. Whereas recognition only occurs on the level of empirical enquiry, experience “is the opening up of the systematic field of empirical inquiry”.

The important implications for HCI is that peace-games, for example, do not train the recognition of ideas of peace through the ‘realistic’ representation of peacemaking scenarios, but instead they open up a systematic field of inquiry out of which new concepts of peace can emerge – since the end product of a system of experience are objects that can be known conceptually. In short, peace-games pose Idea-problems rather than representing knowledge.

Interlude: Foreshadowing the Subject

To problematize experience necessarily leads to reconsider the notion of the subject. According to Deleuze, experience is always an experience of the new in which the subject is transformed so that Kant’s supposedly self-identical subject could actually not experience. In Kant the relation of the subject to itself is static because the empirical subject correlates exactly to the transcendental one. In Deleuze’s critique the transcendental conditions can actually never reach complete correspondence with the empirical, with the consequence that the subject’s internal relations are always in motion and never complete. The transformation of the subject happens when the field of empirical inquiry – and thereby a system of experience – opens up. More importantly, given that experience is never complete, the subject can always be transformed anew.

Producing a System of Experience; Producing the Individual

Predictably, Deleuze transforms the Kantian notion of a system by showing how a system of experience is generated. Importantly, a system arises out of the indeterminate, “a movement we can conceive of by means of an idea.” Furthermore, multiple systems can exist, however, without forming a unity or whole. Batra shows that Deleuze accounts for an internal production of the individual with the system that is opened up. She argues that if this cannot be shown however, then “Deleuze has not truly given any account in which the conditions by which experience is ordered arise from within experience itself.” The difference between Kant and Deleuze is that Kant found the conditions for possible objects in the transcendental subject, whereas Deleuze located them in experience itself. Thus, for Deleuze the question of empirical cases is actually a problem of individuation.

Individuation and Intensive Differences

As mentioned earlier, a systematic field is opened up by an Idea, but the production of a field only happens as the actualization of this Idea. Deleuze uses the concept of intensity in order to explain how this actualization occurs – because intensity for Deleuze is individualizing.

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29 Ideas function on an epistemological as well as ontological level, meaning that they account for the fact that objects can be known and for their being as well. Furthermore, through the opening of a system, knowledge is opened up as well. However, knowledge in this sense is knowledge of empirical inquiry, Batra, p. 3.
30 Ibid, p. 3.
31 Ibid, p.3.
33 Batra, 2010, p. 3.
34 Ibid, p. 4.
36 Ibid, p. 104.
37 Ibid, p. 104.
Intensity is an internal difference, occurring within a singular unit rather than between two already distinct ones. Intensity can be experienced by and is significant for the subject.

According to Deleuze, elements or attractors within an Idea coexist and are in a reciprocal relation. However, the relation between the elements can change to an asymmetrical one and this relation is then intensity. Therefore, “intensities are implicated multiplicities, ‘implexes’, made up of relations between asymmetrical elements which direct the course of the actualization of Ideas and determine the case of solution for problems”. Thus, by bringing elements into a new relation intensity expresses the Idea in a new way, so that “the power of intensity is grounded in the potentiality of the Idea”. This means two crucial things. First, Ideas are virtual. Second, it is intensity that moves an Idea from the virtual to the actual and, thus, occurs during actualization without being actual itself.

The key here is that intensive differences spontaneously drive moments of change and that the direction of this change tends toward equilibrium, since according to DeLanda intensive properties “tend to average themselves”. Therefore, systems seem to seek stabilization and intensive difference can be seen as a system of dissymmetry that has potential energy – “difference is the sufficient reason of change to the extent that change tends to negate the difference”. Decisively, for Deleuze intensity is then the transcendental condition and, thus, cannot be known empirically. What can be known and experienced is the difference it produces. Furthermore, individuation also occurs through the means of intensity, whereby “individuals are produced in and thorough the system that unfolds from the Idea”. Therefore, the production of a system of experience follows from the virtual to the actual with intensity being the “sufficient reason”.

For Deleuze as well as for Simondon the becoming individual, marked by singularities, is not only the product of individuation, but the site or theatre of individuation. Intensive differences produce the individual which undergoes the most extreme movements and forces

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38 Ibid, p. 305, In fact, it is only through their relation that they can be said to exist.
39 Ibid, p. 305.
40 Ibid, p. 305.
41 Ibid, p. 108. To further highlight what Deleuze means by intensity here and how this concept taken from the natural sciences helps him to account for the problem of reality as it is experienced, it is important to remember the crucial distinction between intensive and extensive properties. Whereas extensive differences such as length, area or volume are divisible, intrinsic differences are continuous and do not change even if the quantity changes, as for example pressure and temperature. If a litre of water at 30 degrees Celsius is halved, then the temperature does not half to 15 degrees. For further discussion of intensive properties, see DeLanda, M. 2011. Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason. London: Continuum, chapter 1. The importance however is not that intensive properties are indivisible, but that a change could only ever be in kind (and in scale) and that during such a phase of qualitative transition, the element is losing symmetry and, thus, changing its dynamic.
43 Batra, 2010, p. 111, Deleuze often refers to these individual potentials as singularities.
44 Deleuze, 1994, p. 282.
45 Interestingly, the product, reality structures itself according to extensive properties, as we tend to think in this way.
during this process.\textsuperscript{48} Deleuze calls the product of this forceful theatre of individuation the larval subject, which is not an actual individual yet. The larval subject undergoes these experiences of movement as it becomes an individual. Importantly, not only humans or animals can undergo these tensions, but “wherever there is synthesis or contraction, there is a larval subject undergoing this contraction”.\textsuperscript{49}

**Perspective: From the Larval to the Individual**

On the path of experience the next step is to look at how the individual emerges out of the larval subject and that this individual is virtual and actual at the same time.\textsuperscript{50} Since the individual started as the solution to a problem, it is in fact the actualization of that problem in one particular way. As this one solution, the individual does not actually exhaust or entirely represent the problem. The individual “virtually implicates the entire system to which it is a solution”, also meaning that it stays related to the initial Idea.\textsuperscript{51} Ultimately, whereas the larval subject only ‘exists’ during the move from the virtual to the actual, the individual is virtual as well as actual and only arises because it is a response to an Idea-problem.\textsuperscript{52}

Crucially, during the system’s production perspective is produced through the synthesis of each intensity. Deleuze introduces perspective to account for the fact that different individuals then experience things differently.\textsuperscript{53} Following Leibniz, he argues that systems of experience cannot emerge outside the. Accordingly, “each series tells a story: not different points of view on the same story, like the different points of view […] but completely distinct stories which unfold simultaneously”.\textsuperscript{54} In contrast, from a phenomenological standpoint of access there would only be different points of view on the same story. To compare it to Kant, different points of view based on different experiences can eventually converge, as in they can be brought together additively, forming a unifying plane. The fact that in Deleuze’s work diverging worlds (or stories) exceed the unity of a single world does not mean that multiple Ideas and intensities cannot coexist.\textsuperscript{55} In fact they only exist because they of the excess of the multiplicity.\textsuperscript{56} In other words, even though all intensities are connected with each other they do not give rise to the same individuating processes and, thus, do not express the same world. Ultimately, different systems of experiences cannot be

\textsuperscript{48} Deleuze draws on embryology to understand this course: There are ‘things’ only an embryo can do, movements that it alone can undertake or withstand […] The destiny and achievement of the embryo is to live the unliveable, to sustain forced movements of a scope that would break any skeleton or tear ligaments”, Deleuze, 1994, p. 267.


\textsuperscript{50} Or as Deleuze says, has a virtual and actual “half”, Deleuze, 1994, p. 350.

\textsuperscript{51} Batra, 2010, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{52} Pausing here for a moment, due to this the paper assumes that that the individual’s continuous relation to the idea and its persisting virtual half is one driver why peace-games are played over and over again –since one individuation is only one particular solution, which at the same time still bears an entire system of alternatives.

\textsuperscript{53} Deleuze, 1994, p. 150. Perspective is what he ascribes to the actual part, whereas he refers to the unconscious as belonging to the virtual part. Note that he only uses the unconscious as virtual in relation to human beings. Batra, 2010, p. 124.

\textsuperscript{54} Deleuze, 1994, p. 150.

\textsuperscript{55} To the contrary, “the important point is the simultaneity and contemporaneity of all the divergent series” which makes them “all coexist”, Deleuze 1994, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{56} For example, the system of language could not ever be exhausted by all of the books ever written and to be written.
added together to form a totality or unifying whole. Crucially then, experience is always organized in genuinely different ways.\textsuperscript{57}

**Ordinary Experience and Involuntary Thought**

As just outlined, the individual is produced and structured in a way that it is able to be transformed or affected. Indeed the individual’s indeterminacy –the virtual half– that allows for new systems to open up, is therefore the foundation of experience to occur for the subject. Importantly however, experience will only occur if it is “forced to occur”.\textsuperscript{58} In the context of HCI, specifically peace-gaming, this means that “things will continue to make sense in an ordinary way, according to our ordinary empirical judgements so long as nothing happens that disturbs it”.\textsuperscript{59} Ordinary experience will only be disrupted if the individual is confronted with something unrecognizable, which arguably is precisely the intention of peace-game designs –the continuous confrontation something new, extraordinary and unrecognizable, which has so far not been part of the peacemaking/thinking repertoire.

Interestingly, this rupture or shock to ordinary experience will necessarily be sensible, to which Deleuze refers to as “sign”.\textsuperscript{60} The sign itself is perceived as intensive difference by the individual. It appears as something unrecognizable for which the subject/individual does not have any system of meaning yet. According to Deleuze and Batra, sensibility tries to grasp this new appearance but fails to do so because the sign only appears as difference or movement.\textsuperscript{61} It is argues that this process is taking place during peace-gaming. The stimuli in the game –more precisely the elements or attractors of the gaming software– are differences in programming, the sign, which generate differential movement. The player has yet to grapple with this coding difference and it is the generating and circulation of signs as well as this struggle for meaning during experiences that peace-gaming aims at. Crucially, signs can therefore be seen as the “transcendental condition of sensibility for the subject”.\textsuperscript{62}

It is this encounter of the sign, the synthesis of different intensities that “forces thought to occur and to pose a problem”.\textsuperscript{63} This is what Deleuze refers to as learning –as contrasted with the possession of knowledge– and what peace-game designers seek to enforce during the game and which only happens through the encounter. According to Deleuze, this encounter depends on chance so that there is only involuntary thought and that the system that is opened up does not exist as a possibility before the encounter.\textsuperscript{64} Transferred to peace-gaming then, the game designers seek to design contingency into the game and architecture it in a way that increases the chance of these forceful encounters.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{57} Batra, 2010, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{58} Batra, 2010, p. 126, own emphasis.
\textsuperscript{59} Batra, 2010, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{60} Deleuze, 1994, p. 176.
\textsuperscript{61} Batra, 2010, p. 126-127; Deleuze, 1994, pp. 176.
\textsuperscript{62} Batra, 2010, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{64} Deleuze, 1994, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{65} I have explained this in greater detail elsewhere, see Kaltofen, 2012, “Affective Game Design: Managing Contingency and Scripting Possible Futures”, Aberystwyth University, draft.
Experience can then occur for the subject, because the encounter can open up a new system of meaning. Basing the argument on Batra’s work, this new system “can appear as a new kind of engagement with things or a new set of practices”. Arguably, this is the ideal outcome of peace-games, that the process of learning initiates new, supposedly better, engagements with the concept of peace and improves peacemaking practices. The extent to which it is anticipated that the new system of meaning produces another concept of peace is up for speculation and something that needs to be investigated further. However, important here is that the subject can undergo experience only if a new system of meaning has opened up. Importantly, this is not a case of recognition of pre-established knowledge, but the encounter with the new.

This also implies that the opening of a system of experience is not initiated by the subject, but through the Idea. Thus, the subject is passive, a larval subject, as it still has to struggle for meaning of the encounter. Hence, experience then begins with the Idea that will be grasped by the individual, which however only comes into existence at the end of individuation and the experiencing process. Thus the individual can relate or think the idea only retrospectively – “thought must follow the path of experience in reverse”.

Then a Shock to Thought

In order to account for how the subject then experiences the production of a system of experience let us recall that according to Deleuze, our relationship to objects is that of simple recognition, which happens in the ordinary sphere or already established knowledge. It was argued that this relation can be disrupted by the occurrence of a sign, something unrecognizable, disturbingly unfamiliar and unexpected for thought. As Batra states “a sign is precisely not meaningful because it occurs outside of any previously known system of meaning”. This is when experience begins or can be experienced. Furthermore, according to Deleuze, experience also always “begins with sensibility”. Since the sign is unrecognizable for our senses, we can only recognize what it conditions (the object), but not the process of becoming object. Therefore, signs exceed the senses and empirical experience, which leads Deleuze to contrast Kant in arguing that the transcendental does not overlap with the empirical, but exceeds it.

The sign is understood as a hint during empirical experience, which because it is also intensity comes into relation with us, the subject. That experience can only happen when the individual is shocked and forms a relation with something else, means that experience can only arise anew from the sensible and not from a concept, since the latter only belongs to the subject. Therefore, an experience of peace during peace-gaming does not arise anew from the concept of peace, but from a sensible sign that the playing subject encounters during the game. The concept is something that develops out of this encounter and that is

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66 The encounter has a transformative affect on both parts, which is due to the virtual halves of the individuals.
68 Intensity as the condition of possible experience, Deleuze 1994, p. 291.
70 Ibid, p. 129.
71 Deleuze, 1994, p. 182.
72 Yet, the object of experience emits the sign when it becomes distorted so that it reveals its virtual half. Batra, 2010, p. 130.
unique to the subject alone. Thus, experience begins with sensibility and then leads to thought and concepts.\(^73\)

Ultimately, this is how experience can occur for the gamer-subject and how it is forced to think in the course of peace-gaming. Arguably, experience and thought then begin contingently and not because of the nature of the subject. Again this contrasts Phenomenologists and Kant as well as other philosophers such as Plato and Descartes who view thinking as the natural condition –that we naturally tend to think.\(^74\) On the contrary, Deleuze argues that thought only occurs when it is forced to, so that “the natural state is \textit{not thinking}”.\(^75\) However, this begs the question then, who is thinking, since thought does not move in its own accord. In the pursuit of this question Deleuze turns to Proust, arguing that only those subjects who are unable to recognize what everyone else recognizes will be forced to think.\(^76\)

Again, this is what Deleuze calls learning –the process the subject undergoes when a system of experience is opened up. Learning is what peace-gaming then seems to initiate in the participants, to confront them “with the objectivity of a problem (Idea)”, but not by ways of Kantian recognition, because knowledge only designates the “generality of concepts or the calm possession of a rule enabling solution”.\(^77\) However, since this is a contingent process there can be no method for learning then –at least not in a Cartesian way that it could be determined a priori “how reason should be used in order to achieve knowledge”.\(^78\) The only way one can learn, or is forced to learn, is through constant training or constant playing in this context. That is the continuous engagement with unrecognizable problems.

Deleuze refers to this as a form of apprenticeship, by continuously bringing together points of our body with other elements to form a problematic field.\(^79\) These contact points implicate then that learning is not merely a cognitive process, which is perhaps one of the biggest contrast to Phenomenology and peace-gaming theorization, which both focus on perception in order to make sense of and learn about the environment they are in. However, according to Deleuze, learning goes beyond cognition by necessitating the engagement with elements of something else, which is “a matter of penetrating the Idea”.\(^80\)

Important for learning during peace-gaming is that the subject is not complete, but in a larval state and still becoming. Thus, the conscious player subject is not present during the opening of a system of experience, so that “learning always takes place in and through the unconscious”.\(^81\) Remarkably, this means that a system cannot simply be opened through the engagement with some ‘objective content’, which is a conscious act. This is quite decisive for

\(^{73}\) Hence, intensity is the transcendental object of sensibility, which contrasts Kant and Phenomenologists, who view intensity as the as the anticipation of perception prior to experience.

\(^{74}\) Deleuze, 1994, p. 175.

\(^{75}\) Batra, 2010, p. 133.

\(^{76}\) Deleuze, 1994, p. 63; pp. 175-6.

\(^{77}\) Ibid, p. 204. “Objectivity” here indicates that the problem is not subject, but not completely objective either, since it does not occur independently of the subject.


\(^{79}\) Ibid, p. 134.

\(^{80}\) Deleuze, 1994, p. 206; p. 343

\(^{81}\) Deleuze, p. 205. This makes the unconscious the space of subjectivity formation as well as the space in which experience opens up.
the move towards thinking and practicing peace through gaming and not merely through the conscious study of constituted knowledge about peacemaking.

This also means that the subject cannot use the concepts it already possesses to grasp the new. Indeed, given the fact that experience is always of something unrecognizable, any already established concept will be insufficient. In order for the subject to undergo experience and leave behind old concepts, it needs to be opened up. Arguably then, peace-gaming not only opens up system of experiences, but the participants as well.\(^{82}\)

\textit{On the Development of an Experience – The New}

The appearance of a sign may or may not open up a system of experience. If it does, then the sign functions as the transcendental reorganization of experience.\(^{83}\) Experience is organized through what Deleuze calls transcendental differentiation. In the progressive development of a system of experience, differentiation spelled with a “t” comes before differenciation, spelled with a “c”.\(^{84}\) The former indicates the development of an idea. It refers to the elements and the relation between them that come to constitute an Idea. After this, a system emerges for the subject, which Deleuze refers to as differenciation, which is the movement through which objects are produced.\(^{85}\) This linguistic and conceptual distinction (“c”/“t”) is important, because it enables Deleuze to explain how an idea arises within experience (differentiation) and how the subject comes to see this as an already ordered experience which is the actualization of the system of experience (differenciation), which is something that Kant was not able to do.

It is important for thinking and conceptualizing peace that concepts occur on this level of organized empirical experience. After a system has opened up it can be explored, and one way would be to generate concepts. This is because concepts articulate empirical cases and their relation to a systematic field. Empirical objects that emerge out of the production of a system and structured experience can be investigated and known through according singular concepts. Significantly, concepts depend on experience and new concepts can only arise out of new experience. The starting point of this paper was that this is what Kant was unable to account for, the new, in experience as well as in concepts. Significantly, this makes the opening and production of a system a creative moment, which is as such very influential and powerful.\(^{86}\)

\(^{82}\) Insofar as the conscious subject during peace-gaming is concerned –vis a vis the unconscious learning subject– this means that the gamer experiences objects as already ordered with the system and it is impossible from this conscious position to point towards any development of the system of experience and in learning. Or in Batra’s words, the conscious subject arrives late to the ‘scene’. Remember thought is captured in reverse Batra, 2010, p. 138.

\(^{83}\) Ibid, p. 138.

\(^{84}\) Ibid, p. 140; Deleuze, 1994, pp. 262-264.

\(^{85}\) Batra explains that for example, we perceive objects as already possessing certain attributes such as colour, because empirical experiences are always already structured according to colour or other familiar features. Batra, 2010, p. 141.

\(^{86}\) The ways in which this can be capitalized is explained in Kaltofen, 2012.
Interim Balance and Transcendental Empiricism

The former section showed how Deleuze uses the notion of intensity to explain the development from the Idea to the production of individuals. The discussion of the encounter sought a path away from the Kantian pre-established subject and external conditions for thought. This move also implies to abandon the idea of a transcendent regulative ideal, which provides individuals with common sense understanding. Thus, it was shown how Deleuze replaces Kant’s field of transcendence with a “transcendental field” or “plane of immanence”.

The “transcendental” differs from “transcendence” in the way that the latter refers to that which is external to experience, whereas the transcendental relates to that which is directly experienced. Therefore, Deleuze’s transcendental field does not attempt to represent that which is outside of experience, but it implies systems of experience that opened up internally. The transcendental field means that experience is not given to the autonomous, pre-established and conscious subject. To recap, Deleuze uses the term singularities to refer to the “pre-individual, pre-personal and a-conceptual” in the transcendental field of experience. As Colebrook explains, “we might say that there just ‘is’ experience, without subjects or objects, inside or outside…a pure flow of life and perception without any distinct perceivers”. Analysing peace-gaming then shows that instead of an already present subject who experiences various peace strategies, there is only thought and only experience in the act of gaming.

In order to bridge the first and the second section –the pre-individual experience that is the idea in a transcendental field of experience– Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s notion of a “plane of immanence” is indispensable. More precisely, it abandons the formerly criticised separation of mind and matter, according to which the former transcends the latter in order to represent an external material world. Instead of having two separate planes, “the plane of immanence locates the being of the subject as well as the being of an outside world on the same plane: a plane that consists solely of impersonal and pre-individual elements of thought and experience”. This renders the “outside world” and the “subject” into integral elements of thought and experience, placing the peace-gamer and gaming-technology on the same plane.

Importantly, the plane of immanence is not immanent to something or someone and, thus, cannot be put into opposition of something that is assumed to exist externally or prior to it. Immanence has to be understood as immanent to itself and nothing else. This is why Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism has to start with experience as such without the a priori.

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92 Lundborg, 2008, p. 43.
93 To do so would unavoidably reintroduce the distinction between the subject and the outside world as well as it would resuscitate the illusion of transcendence. Ibid, p. 45.
distinction of internal-external and subject-object. Ultimately, the post-phenomenological and post-Kantian framework of this paper is that of Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism.

Peace-gaming and gamers are then thought of as being made up of and existing as singularities on the plane of immanence or transcendental field according to which there is no distinction between the internal and the external of the peace-gamer nor the gamer-subject, and the gaming technology and the ‘outside world’. There is only a pure flow of experience without a pre-established gamer-subject who experiences. Thus, it is not the peace-gamer who initiates the opening up and organization of a system of experience, but the synthesis of differential intensities. Nor can the peace-gamer experience the opening up of a system, as according to Deleuze thoughts works backwards and that peace-gamers can only grasp ideas of peace in retrospect.

Most importantly, it was argued that experience is a creative process – rendering peace-gaming something active and innovative rather than reactive and representational. It is an encounter that forces its participants to think, so that peace-gaming is a locus of emerging subjectivities of peace. Brian Massumi refers to these creative processes as “productivism” rather than constructivism, with a focus on processes as such and not on the static conception of some constructed “thing”.

The aim of thinking he argues is not to represent or describe, but rather to embrace the inventiveness that is embedded in the process of thinking. Underlying these processes and, thus, experience is a certain degree of experimentation that does not seek to uncover an essence but to create different ways of thinking. In this way, the paper proposes that peace-gaming should be viewed as a form of productivism, an inventive experimentation of peace.

However, the relation between the participants of that experiment and the peace-gaming technology has been dealt with in a rather unproblematic way. This is by no means as simple as the outline of the production of an individual/subject may suggest, as it would assume a distinction between peace-gaming technology and player-body. How the relation, or unit rather, of ‘the two’ is thought of will be the focus of the last section. The aim is not only to problematize players and technology, but to show how their unit actually experiences the opening and production of a system of experience.

The Peacemaker Body?
To question the human/non-human boundary is certainly a problem that has fascinated philosophers, social and natural/computer scientists for quite some time. With the paper’s focus on the pre-subjective and pre-individual, the problem of the boundary, rather non-boundary in HCI, can be rearticulated in the following question: why do intensities that come to constitute the subject necessarily belong to the ‘body’ of the individual? Given that these syntheses happen precisely because of the gaming environment, this would suggest that intensities are not primarily human, but technical or both. If this is the case, that subjects emerge out of non-organic movements and matter, then this surely troubles the boundary between the players (supposedly human) and the gaming technology (supposedly non-human).

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The argument here is threefold. First, during acts of gaming we witness the emergence of bodies/subjects that are neither only human nor technical, but (non)(organic). Second, the boundaries of this body do not correspond to the body of the player—the body, as well as the emerging subject, are much wider in this case, extending to other player bodies and objects within the immediate environment. Third, the boundaries of these (non)(organic) entities are in constant flux, extending and contracting all the time and according to the course of the game.

To substantiate these claims it will be draw on Simondon’s ‘technicity’ in order to further problematize the question of peace-gaming technology; Latour’s “pragmatogonies” and his claim that humans and nonhumans swap properties\(^{95}\); Manuel DeLanda’s non-organic life\(^{96}\) and Deleuze and Guattari’s “body without organs” (BwO).\(^{97}\)

\textit{(Non)(Organic) Life: Experience Beyond Skin}

To be able to think about the boundaries between peace-gaming technology and its users, it is inevitable to at least dip into discussions about the bloodless abstraction of technology itself.\(^{98}\) This sets no easy task for this remaining section, as it has to strike a difficult balance between simplifying philosophies of the body and technology for the purpose of this paper, without creating yet another abstraction and disregarding the tremendous complexity and sophistication of existing debates about these ‘concepts’.

In many ways technology, especially new and advanced technology such as peace-gaming, present a “double bind”.\(^{99}\) As highlighted by peace-game, we are diversely technological. Yet, precisely such technologies have become somewhat of a problem-fetish.\(^{100}\) Technical practices are often claimed to be invading the living, human body or attacking it.\(^{101}\) An assertion that leads many critical thinkers to claim that technology is with(in) us, often as an extension to the body and that technology and body are fundamentally entwined.\(^{102}\)

However, this invasion is not a simple addition of a foreign object to the body, but it means that the natural, original body does not exist as such, dismantling the “ideal interiority” and boundaries of the “body and soul”.\(^{103}\) In agreement with such arguments, bodies are seen as sites of complication, encounters and collective processes and as historical, technical and discursive entities. However, the paper does not agree with the assertion that bodies are also natural and material entities in the way that they are pre-given and genetically determined.

\(^{95}\) Latour, 1994, pp. 791-808.
\(^{98}\) Of course this is not the first time that attempts have been made to deal with this, and this section stands in the shadow and debt to Simondon, Latour, Donna Haraway, Andrew Pickering, Martin Heidegger, Don Idhe among many others.
\(^{100}\) Latour, 1994, p. 793.
\(^{102}\) Mackenzie, 2002, p. 6; p. 10.
Thus, the difference or disagreement might seem small but does affect experience and the body significantly.

**Technology ≠ Technicity**

In the *Du Mode d’existence des objets techniques* Simondon argues that the misconception of the way in which technical objects exist puts an obstacle to seeing their share in the constitution of the ‘human’ and human collectives.\(^\text{104}\) Simondon introduces the notion of *technicity*, in order to show the indeterminacy associated with technology, that it neither belongs only to human nor to technological dynamics. Accordingly, technicity “means that humans realized that there are different ways of reaching purposes through artifacts”.\(^\text{105}\) This binds technicity to function, distinguishing between different functions and, thus, degrees of technicity. Noteworthy, Simondon went on to problematize natural objects, as for example organs do have functions as well, which are all too often artificially, externally influenced.\(^\text{106}\) For this, Simondon uses the term originary technicity. While originary technicity opens up the concept of the human(subject), technicity opens up the technical object, which implies a shift in the perspective on technology not so much towards the technical object as such, but to the processes under way when technical objects and humans open up (and exchange).

This highlights sides of human-technological collectives that are not fully lived, symbolized or represented. While there is no room to look at Simondon’s analysis of technological ensembles and what he views as technical objects, what matters here is that Simondon argues for the different modes of existence of technical objects and that these are objects-as-processes.\(^\text{107}\) This implies divergent tendencies of that which normally stabilizes the innate technical object. Hence, technicity diffracts technical objects into a “network of references or relays” that includes other elements, gestures, practices and institutions and that “technicity cannot be contained in a single object”.\(^\text{108}\) For example, the technicity of the low-tech Toledo steel blade only comes into existence due to the combination of various processes and elements that are non-technical, even organic, as for example the finer-grained composition of Toledo’s local choral, the chemical make-up of the water as well as the forging techniques used.\(^\text{109}\) Thus, even simple technical elements such as knives or a stone hand-axe only exist due to organic matter organization. The argument here continues to suggest that is the case for high-tech peace-gaming as well.\(^\text{110}\)

For Simondon technicity cannot be seen as the reduction of the living to the non-living or vice versa. Instead, it suggests the “co-implication of the living in the non-living”, the

\(^\text{104}\) “the mode of existence of technical objects”, Mackenzie, 2002, p. 11.


\(^\text{106}\) This leads Simondon to discuss the difference between natural and biological objects. Unfortunately it would exceed the boundaries of this paper to account for this, but see de Vries, 2008.


\(^\text{110}\) The contemporary example of bio-technology, such as hybridization –the reading and sorting of genetic material–, makes this quite clear as well, Mackenzie, 2002, p. 193.
human in the technical.\footnote{Ibid, p. 193.} Furthermore, technical ensembles bring human and technical bodies together, by opening up both of them into far reaching technological processes. Ultimately, there is no purely non-organic, non-living, technical artifact or element; the technicity exists precisely in the linkage between non-living and living.

Eventually, Simondon’s technicity allows to argue that technology and the body are open (or opened up strictly speaking) – hence, the living and the non-living as not processing clear boundaries. Therefore, the body and technology are extending to other forms of existence such as practices and institutions. Importantly, technicity directly addresses the involvement and necessity of the living in the non-living and the other way around.

Applying this to peace-gaming then suggest that it is impossible to draw a line between gaming technology and gamer. Which means that we cannot speak of gaming participants that experience technology. From the view of technicity then both sides are opened up to each other. As much as gamers depend on technology in order to see, hear things and act upon them, the technology itself only functions because it turns the human body into a reservoir of technical elements (i.e. design, engineering, construction and paly).

Because Simondon still distinguishes between the living and the non-living and only goes as far as to suggest their co-constitution and co-implication, the paper will draw on Latour’s claim that humans and non-humans swap properties in order to show that it is unfeasible to conceive of the technical and the human as separate units that enter mediation.

\ldots the Chicken or the Egg\ldots the Human or Technology?

Making this argument means that not only is it untenable to take for granted that we know what the social subject and the social object is, but also that it is impossible to say what the biological human and the scientific nonhuman is. Echoing Latour, previous claims culminate in the argument that there is no plausible way to differentiate between gaming-technology and gamers – in abstract terms between the living and the non-living.\footnote{Note that Latour only goes as far as to include the “collective body, an artifact and a subject”, which means that he leaves the biological body (supposedly confined by organs and skin) untouched. Latour, 1994, p. 793. This will not be the case in this investigation, an obstacle that will be overcome via Manuel DeLanda.} He observes that, historically speaking, it was and is only through the interaction with the non-living that social skills and properties are acquired. Moreover, it is only because these skills are being reimported back to the non-living that the latter “is made to do different things and play different roles”.\footnote{Ibid, p. 804.} In short, it is only because humans and non-humans swapped and still swap properties that both exist and even develop.\footnote{This leads Latour to argue the crucial point that that even the most simplistic technological tool, such as a stone axe, hammer or knife is not just produced by the human from supposedly given matter – such as stone, straw, wood. Instead, it is only due to the level of indeterminacy that ‘both’ can exist. Arguably, this level of indeterminacy between technology and player applies to peace-gaming as well – peace-gaming does not just emerge due to the access to technological know-how and innate, available hardware.}

This (re)importation and swapping of properties suggests then that the usual subject-object division is artificial. Therefore, philosophy of technology, including this paper needs to
overcome “the boring alternation between two different substances,”\textsuperscript{115} in order to view HCI and peace-gaming technology not just as a web of material objects. Instead, the idea is that it entails a lot of what was previously considered human in the same way that the body is “already made in large part of sociotechnical negotiations and artifacts”.\textsuperscript{116} Consequently, ‘humanism’ with its set shape of the human mind and body does not apply in this conception.\textsuperscript{117} This is done by acknowledging that high and low-tech tools and techniques are not used to mediate socio-political action, but that “they are us”.\textsuperscript{118}

**Open Organisms**

In order to collapse this human/non-human distinction it is important to keep in mind that objects undergo individuation as well and that matter-taking-form is not just simply about form being given to an inert passive matter. Thus, it is argued that technology, peace-gaming in particular, is subject to individuation, occurring in tandem with human bodies. This is not a parallel process, but one individuation, that of the technology-body, the (non)(organic). Therefore, entities continuously individuate—a process of matter-taking-form. As first argued by DeLaanda, what “has allowed us to ‘see’ matter as self-organizing is the advance in technology that materially supports (nonlinear) mathematics”, with the consequence that matter has an inherent dynamism deeply troubles the body as closed, given organism.\textsuperscript{119} Rethinking matter as dynamism implicates that the organism is open to information.\textsuperscript{120} As such it is open to change in its structure and organization. Crucially this implicates the human in a postbiological evolution.

The move to open systems and organisms undoes the opposition between the human/organism and the environment, including the dichotomy between the living/non/living.\textsuperscript{121} Patricia Clough states that organisms where made into human subjects due to regimes of representation that rest on a perception of the body as a whole, making it a closed system which depends on energy from the outside.\textsuperscript{122} Luciana Parisi and Tiziana Terranova affirm that “the fluids which were circulating outside and between bodies, are folded onto themselves in order to be channelled within the solid walls of the organism/self/subject”.\textsuperscript{123} Therefore, HCI, here the peacemaker-body and gaming technology, is thought of as open systems—as pre-individual capacity and affectivity. Echoing Parisi and Terranova, it is argued that the body “no longer corresponds to the fleshy representation or phenomenon of the human subject, but rather is open to particles, waves and attractors”.\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, p. 805, own emphasis.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid, p. 806.

\textsuperscript{117} “[W]e want to get rid of our humanity”, Ibid, p. 806.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid, p. 807, original emphasis.


\textsuperscript{120} Ibid, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{122} Ironically, this only draws the body back into its environment.


\textsuperscript{124} Ibid, 2000. For a detailed scientific account on retheorizations of information in terms of far-from-equilibrium conditions; movement from disorder to order and order to disorder; ontologically probabilistic
It's All Just Flow of Experience in A Body Without Organs

Returning to the plane of immanence\(^\text{125}\), pre-subjective and pre-body forces are then seen as non-linear vectors on this plane. Elements, conceived of as dots, are scattered across a vector. The argument here suggests that temporal proximity, overlapping and crossing of these vectors result in a shared individuating process, which is a unit of various elements that are usually attributed to either the human or technology. Given that these vectors are all impersonal, pre-individual and pre-objective, it is impossible to identify in which individuation a vector is going to be part of. Indeed, the vector's virtual attributes (dots) hold all of the possible worlds.

In the case of peace-gaming, it is assumed that gaming-technology (A), gamers (B) and the mixed-media environment (C) are vectors on the same plane, and are brought into close proximity due to the onset of the game. Given that all of the three are not fixed – neither internally nor their boundaries – but are in constant flux and always in a process of becoming, they are continually “reshuffled”. If these vectors (A, B & C) meet, overlap or intersect, elements/dots are shuffled in a way that one unit individuates, which is made up of elements that previously belonged to vector A, B, or C. That only the dots of the various vectors that are close to the encounter will be involved in the individuating process means that the vectors cannot simply be added. Thus an encounter between the three, with a possible thought, experience, body/subject emerging out of that, is not simply A+B+C, but a particular, unique haecceitic mix of the three. The way in which they organize themselves, depends on the intensities of each.\(^\text{126}\) Synthesis will occur because of this encounter, bringing together various intensities from the different vectors. However, as previously mentioned, a new individuating process will only occur if the encounter is the confrontation of something unrecognizable.

In order to flesh this out further, in “nonoraganic life” DeLanda meticulously shows the dynamics of this organization, “self-assembly pattern”.\(^\text{127}\) DeLanda speaks of individuation and self-organization in mathematical terms and refers to the process set in motion by an Idea-problem as “bifurcation”. It occurs when matter encounters a problem and then “spontaneously generates a machinelike solution by drawing from a ‘reservoir’ of abstract mathematical mechanisms”.\(^\text{128}\) Thus, DeLanda provides an insight into how matter/thought struggles to find a solution to the unrecognizable – the equation of the meeting vectors.

Deleuze and Guattari use the term “machinic phylum” for this abstract reservoir of solutions, arguing that the “machinic phylum is materiality, natural or artificial, and both simultaneously: it is matter in movement, in flux, in variation, matter as conveyor of microstates and entropic dissipative structures see Prigogine, I., & Stegner, I. (1984). *Order out of Chaos*. New York: Bantam.

\(^\text{125}\) Meaning that elements composing individual, technological objects and the outside world are on the same plane, Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, chapter 2.

\(^\text{126}\) Remember intensive differences tend to seek equilibrium.

\(^\text{127}\) DeLanda, 1992, p. 131 - In his analysis he moves from fluctuations in gravitational, magnetic fields to “spontaneously emerging chemical patterns in the primeval soup” to “the pruning process of a probiotic natural selection” to rhythmic oscillations in human glycolysis to the electric signals shooting through our nervous systems as the “elementary particles of thought”. The point is that whether periodic or non-periodic and chaotic, matter expresses itself in highly complex and creative ways – something science only recently became aware of.

singularities and traits of expression".\textsuperscript{129} Whereas the term singularities refers to other bifurcations\textsuperscript{130}, “traits of expression” are “emergent properties” that arise in material systems and are those synergetic attributes that individualize the whole as something different than the sum of its parts.\textsuperscript{131} In the case of peace-gaming vectors, A, B, C (matter) are all in movement and flux on the same plane. Their encounter draws on solutions from the machinic phylum so that individuated bodies got their properties from the machinic phylum. Arguably, peace-gaming could then be viewed as “spontaneous transformations”.\textsuperscript{132}

This is not to argue however that bifurcation/synthesis and intensities ("attractors") exist in platonic conditions where the machinic phylum is the realm of ideas, waiting to be actualized. Instead they are intrinsic and immanent features of specific dynamics of a system of experience, which have no existence outside this system. This implies that bodies during peace-gaming have no existence outside of the game, which calls into question the transferability of the gaming experience to actual conflict situations. Furthermore, these are flows cut through all matter –living and non-living, humans and technology. Hence, the machinic phylum is the “single source of spontaneous order for all of reality”.\textsuperscript{133} Accordingly, intensities are then the more or less steady and lasting features of this reality. Ultimately, peace-gaming experience is determined by the intensities, traits of expressions and singularities of the vectors A, B and C. Something new can arise out of this is because of the earlier claim that individuation is a primarily creative process of the unrecognizable. Since bifurcation is nothing else, the spontaneous self-organization of matter is a source of creativity and variability, thus the new.

DeLanda shows how this self-organization happens in various states of matter, organisms, the non-human and human\textsuperscript{134}, and traces how the machinic phylum cuts through all of these different forms and flows. He concludes that “we are all inhabited by processes of nonorganic life. We carry in our bodies a multiplicity of self-organizing processes of a definite physical and mathematical nature”.\textsuperscript{135} Whereas this paper does not deny that human bodies are made up of nonorganic processes, it also suggests that in experimental fields organic and nonorganic form one spatio-temporal body, the (non)(organic).

Deleuze and Guattari’s BwO and concept of “haecceity” comes closest to the (non)(organic), in the way that the authors also reject that a body is “defined by the form that determines it” and that it is neither determined by “substance or subject nor by the organs it possesses or the functions it fulfils”.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{[A]} body [the encounter of the three vectors A, B, C, the (non)(organic)] is defined only by a longitude and latitude: in other words the sum total of the material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item A synthesis that can spiral off of a particular bifurcation.
\item DeLanda, 1992, p. 162.
\item Ibid, p. 138.
\item Ibid, p. 138
\item His example of self-organization in the human ranges from ‘one time’ embryonic developments to life-long and constant DNA replication and synthesis, Ibid, p. 146.
\item Ibid, p. 153.
\item Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 287.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Following Deleuze and Guattari in this, the body during peace-gaming is conceived of as “affects and local movements, differential speeds”. The body’s outline and haecceity during peace-gaming is “not defined by the organs it contains but rather by the forces that intersect it and the things it can do”. Accordingly, not only during peace-gaming, the body is not something that contains “an interior grid of organs”, but it is argued that it is actually a “temporary product of a larger exterior mapping of forces”. Ultimately, peace-gaming provides an ideal setting in which to see how due to systems of experiences bodies emerge and go beyond the borders of the humanist idea of the ‘body and soul’. However, due to the experimental nature of peace-gaming, it is also clear that the individuation of bodies is not entirely up to chance.

Conclusion
The task of this paper was threefold. First, it was an attempt to resuscitate debates about experience within a Speculative Materialist frame and from a post-phenomenological position. Second, it sought to tease out the way in which thoughts emerge out of experience that are not based on Kantian premises of recognition and pregiven structures of the mind. As a consequence and third this led to question who does the experiencing and thinking. Thus, it led to problematize not only technology and the body, but also the boundary between them.

The paper put a great emphasis on a turn away from Kantian epistemological believes about the rational mind; the phenomenal and noumenal world and the subject-object division. It was argued that this Kantian Idealism is the main reason why it is impossible to speak of experience without drawing on phenomenology and, thus, cognition. In order to overcome this, the paper showed how pre-individual and pre-subjective systems of experience emerge out of an Idea-problem. Further, it was argued that this only occurs when something unrecognizable confronts the body-subject (a shock to thought and ordinary experience), which thereby transforms it. In relation to this, the paper outlined the process of individuation, the synthesis of intensities or bifurcation and the various stages a body undergoes in this process (i.e. the larval state). Through these theoretical moves it was shown how it is possible for new experience and new thoughts to occur –something Kantian Idealism prevented.

Consequently, thinking in terms of the plane of immanence and transcendental empiricism calls into question the subject-object distinction and the boundary between the human and the non-human, eventually, the human and technology itself. Hence, to advance to post-Kantianism and post-phenomenology allowed this paper to show that the pre-established

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137 Ibid, p. 287.
138 Ibid, p. 287.
140 Ibid, p. 6.
141 As mentioned, game design plays a crucial part in how and when forces meet; it determines movement, speed and the affect bodies are capable of.
entities of the technology (i.e. non-human, gaming technology) and the player (human, peacemaker body) cannot be taken as given and in fact need to be undone in order for experience to be immanent and not a case of recognition. Rather than dealing with ‘natural boundaries’, it was the intention to show how the self-organization of matter changes how game-player interaction should be thought of. Indeed it was argued that during such individuating processes, technology and player are actually one body, the (non)(organic). This alternative way of thinking about the experiencing body was enabled through rethinking technology (Simondon’s technicity and Latour’s pragmatogonies) and bodies (DeLanda, Deleuze & Guattari).

1 To be brief, peace-gaming –often referred to as serious gaming– is similar to war-gaming as it is used for training purposes and also for dealing with the unpredictable and unthinkable by employing the methods of planning, comparing and mapping, see Dunnigan, J. F. (2003a, June 6-7). “The Dis/Simulations of War and Peace: Predicting, Prophesying, and Preempting the Future after 9.11.”. Retrieved February 02, 2011, from InfoTechWarPeace: http://www.watsoninstitute.org/ infopeace/dissim/war.cfm. It is a practice that is powered by human interaction and mediated by socio-political rules and goals. The peace-games referred to in this paper are based on New Technology that enable more “realistic” scenarios, which seek to increase the plausibility and verisimilitude of peace. These games are mostly played by senior leadership at the governmental level such as S.E.N.S.E. which was developed by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). Initially, S.E.N.S.E. stood for “Synthetic Environments for National Security Estimates”, but in its more recent use in collaboration with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) it refers to “Strategic Economic Needs and Security Exercise”. It is an interactive simulation for decision support, information management and exchange that is played in a synthetic environment created in military black boxes, see White, R. H. (1999). *Introduction to IDA’s S.E.N.S.E.TM- R.S.A. Project. Institute for Defense Analysis*. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis. A Black box is a room in which a computer-generated environment is created; this is primarily based on vision and sound. As introduced by the designers, S.E.N.S.E. is an experimental and hands-on instructional tool for a government during or immediately after conflict, see Dechant, J. (2009, July 16). “Jason Dechant at Smart Tools for Smart Power: Simulations and Serious Games for Peacebuilding” . Retrieved January 15, 2011, from United States Institute of Peace: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UEdQJvKh3E&list=PL480830BCF9f4E893B&index=2&feature=plpp. However, there are other types of serious games such as PeoplePower and AGORA, which are aimed at a civilian audience and are an effort to train civil society for peace and cultivate social intelligence, see Stevens, J. (2003, June 6-7). “The Dis/Simulations of War and Peace: Predicting, Prophesying, and Preempting the Future after 9.11.”. Retrieved January 31, 2011, from InfoTechWarPeace: http://www.watsoninstitute.org/ infopeace/dissim/video.cfm. These games are technologically low-key, but computerized nonetheless, and they request the player to imagine and practice peace in a digital environment. The paper will focus on the first, high-tech type, however.